Thoughts on the Epistemology of Disagreement

Thoughts on the Epistemology of Disagreement J. Neil Daniels When it comes to theology, disagreement isn’t just a nuisance, it’s practically unavoidable. Even within a single denomination, you’ll find sharp divergences over what counts as orthodox, what Scripture truly teaches, and how tradition ought to weigh against personal interpretation. But here’s the tricky part: some disagreements aren’t trivial squabbles; they come from people who really know their stuff, people you might even call your epistemic peers. That matters, because when someone equally equipped challenges your view, it forces you to ask, almost against your natural inclination, “Do I actually know what I think I know?” Encountering a peer’s disagreement in theology is like looking at your reflection in a slightly warped mirror. You see yourself, but a bit askew. Some scholars call this “higher-order evidence”—the notion that the disagreement itself is evidence about your own epistemic reliability. Imagine you’ve spen...